DEBATE

IS THE UNITED NATIONS STILL RELEVANT?
The relevance of the United Nations (UN) to the development of
international law and to international security remains vigorously
contested. In this inaugural debate, we have invited contributions
from two scholars who reflect the division. Professor William BurkeW1hite, of Penn, contends that "[t]lie active engagement of the
Security Council and a range of other UN organs in the processes of
international lawmaking has never been more necessary." Indeed,
Burke-White maintains that "[t]he UN and its organs are more
urgently needed today than ever before to facilitate the creation of
broad international treaties, to codify and interpret customary rules,
or to 'legislate' on behalf of the global community."
Professor
Abraham Bell, of Bar-Ilan and Fordham, is less sanguine.
Bell
"argue [s] that the UN makes a net negative contribution to aggregate
international welfare in all but the category of facilitating mostly noncontroversial treaties." Further, lie suggests "that legal rules and
institutions should be judged by the results they produce rather than
the aspirations they purport to represent." On this score, lie writes, "it
is far from self-evident that the good aspirations produce good
results," and that "only the good results should interest us." We
welcome your thoughts, comments, and reactions to the lively
exchange below.
OPENING STATEMENT

The Indispensable United Nations: A Necessary Forumfor International
Lawmaking in Response to Global Challenges
William W. Burke-White'
In the wake of the failure of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council to legitimate or prevent the 2003 war in Iraq, the summer
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2006 impasse over a resolution to the conflict in Lebanon, and the
likely September 2006 stalemate with Iran over nuclear development,
there are good reasons to be skeptical about the ability of the Security
Council and, perhaps, the broader UN to fulfill their mandates to
maintain international peace and security. Yet, in the face of new
global challenges ranging from environmental degradation to
infectious disease, from the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction to the prevention of terrorism, international lawmaking
through the UN may be the best and possibly only means to promote
international peace and security through the rule of law. The active
engagement of the Security Council and a range of other UN organs
in the processes of international lawmaking have never been more
necessary.
In pursuing their various interests, states may choose from a broad
array of means to cooperate. At times, they may choose non-legalized
forms of cooperation such as implicit understandings and
"handshake" agreements. In other circumstances, they may opt for
formal legal arrangements with a single partner, such as a bilateral
investment treaty. At still other times, regional treaties such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European
Convention on Human Rights may be preferred. The importance of
such forms of lawmaking should not be underestimated; there are
more than 60,000 bilateral treaties deposited with the UN. Yet, the
processes of globalization, the growing dangers posed by transnational
threats, and the need for broad global coordination requires legal
rules that reach across the globe, beyond any single relationship or
region. Despite its faults and limitations, the UN is by far the bestsuited institution to lead the global lawmaking that is essential to
respond to these new challenges. The UN's longstanding prominence
in the creation and enforcement of international legal rules must
continue if the present moment's challenges are to be met through
the law.
While the Security Council's exercise of its Chapter VII authority
is the most likely to make the headlines, international lawmaking
through the UN takes a number of forms. The International Law
Commission (ILC)-a group of international legal experts tasked
with the progressive development of international law--meets
annually to develop foundational drafts for future international
treaties, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
and to explicate rules of customary international law, such as the Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, which codifies customary rules of state liability. In addition, the
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UN Sixth Committee offers a forum for discussion of international
legal issues. The Human Rights Council (HRC) (formerly the Human
Rights Commission) provides important jurisprudence in human
rights law and monitors state compliance with human rights
obligations. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the chief legal
organ of the UN, has a growing caseload of interstate legal disputes
and has pushed the development of international law through
important precedents interpreting international treaties and
identifying rules of customary international law. Perhaps the most
important contribution of the UN to international lawmaking,
however, is its role in the creation of new international treaties. A
wide variety of international treaties-ranging from the 1982
Convention on the High Seas to the 1999 Convention on the
Financing of Terrorism-have been negotiated tinder UN auspices.
In fact, since 1945, the UN is the official depository of 517 concluded
nmultilateral treaties.
The UN offers at least four critical benefits to international treaty
making. First, and perhaps most important, is the possibility for wide,
and sometimes even universal, participation in the creation of the
legal rules that regulate international affairs.
Every state is
represented at the UN and can be included in the processes of
international lawmaking. While it is true that bilateral or regional
agreements may result in deeper levels of commitmentm-greater
synergies of interests are likely to be found amongst smaller numbers
of states-the challenges and dangers the global community faces
today demand the near universal participation in legal regimes made
most possible through the UN. W'hether international law seeks to
regulate the Internet, respond to global warming, combat
international terrorism, or address pandemic diseases, the exclusion
or defection of only a small number of states may well render the
broader enterprise of legalization worthless. A handful of serious
polluters, a few safe havens for terrorists, or even one epicenter of
disease outbreak may well undermine an otherwise global legal
regime.
The UN, with its broad reach, its all-enconpassing
membership, and its agenda-setting potential may well be the best
(and perhaps the only) hope for developing universal legal regimes
that can effectively respond to these new challenges.
Second, international lawmaking through the UN offers a global
legitimacy critical to creating effective legal rules. Admittedly, the UN
is subject to criticismn--somne of it justified-and its effectiveness has
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been questioned by the current US administration. Yet, for much of
the rest of the world, the UN remains the preeminent, if not the only,
institution capable of conferring legal legitimacy worldwide. While
many states note the lack of representativeness of the Security
Council, they nonetheless respect the bargain struck in San Francisco
in 1945 and the normative force of an institution designed to "save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Whatever form
international lawmaking takes-be it a multilateral treaty or the
identification of customary rules in a decision by the ICJ-the fact that
such rules were created through the UN creates a considerable
"conpliance pull" for many states to ratify international treaties,
accept customary rules and, perhaps, change their behavior.
Third, the UN allows representation of diverse interests and
promotes more equitable outcomes. Working through the UN allows
poorer or less-developed states (particularly those from the Global
South) to be included in the creation of international legal rules.
Whereas many states lack the resources to monitor the ad hoc
creation of legal rules and many fewer send representatives to every
diplomatic conference where such rules may be created, all are
represented at the UN. In contrast to regional arrangements or
bilateral arrangements, international lawmaking through the UN
affords the possibility for preexisting subgroups of states to assert
collective interests to counterbalance powerful states. The result may
be more equitable legal rules to which there may be more widespread
adherence.
A fourth important benefit of international lawmaking through
the UN is the considerable reduction in contracting costs-making
cooperation easier to achieve and legal rule making more efficientaccompanying the use of a preexisting international institution. The
standing organs of the UN provide an already established forum for
the negotiation of international treaties, the codification of emerging
customary norms, and the explication of rules through judicial
decisions. Organizing large conferences of states to conclude a treaty,
setting the terms of reference for such a negotiation, or undertaking
the background legal work to make a new treaty can be
extraordinarily costly and time consuming, often preventing
agreements from being reached. Collectively, the institutions of the
UN-in which long-term investments have already been madeprovide a relatively efficient means of lawmaking and require
considerably less incremental expense. For example, the ILC, as part
of its normal work, may engage in years of background preparation
for a possible new treaty. State delegations in New York may discuss
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and deliberate an emerging rule or proposed treaty. The UN
Secretariat may coordinate an international treaty conference and the
ICJ may interpret the resultant treaty in any subsequent dispute. The
enhanced coordination and more cost-effective process that often
accompanies international lawmaking through the UN may well result
in new international agreements that otherwise would have been
prohibitively costly to conclude.
Beyond its critical role in the creation and interpretation of
international treaties, the UN Security Council has taken important
new steps in response to pressing global threats. Whereas the Security
Council has traditionally created international legal obligations under
its Chapter VII authority with respect to individual states and in
response to a clear threat to international peace and security, the
Council has, in recent years, become more willing to recognize threats
to international peace and security and to direct its lawmaking
authority at the international community at large. For example, in
res)onse to systematic human rights abuse-traditionally a matter
within the sovereign domain of states and outside the Council's
purview-the Council has found a threat to international peace and
security, invoked Chapter VII, created binding legal obligations, and
even legitimated the use of military force to end such abuses.
Likewise, the Council has shown a new willingness to create legal
obligations for all states to utilize their domestic systems to respond to
pressing international threats. For example, Resolution 1373 requires
states to "prevent the commission of terrorist acts" through the
domestic criminalization of terrorism financing, freezing of terrorist
assets by national authorities, use of domestic courts to bring to justice
those involved in terrorist acts, and ratification by domestic authorities
of relevant antiterrorism conventions. While some have criticized
such "legislation" by the Security Council as ultra vires, it offers an
important new tool for the creation of universal legal rules and state
obligations to respond to the most urgent threats and challenges.
The imposition on all states of such specific obligations to take
domestic action is likely to be a critical element of the future of
international lawmaking. Only the UN Security Council has the legal
capacity to do so.
Admittedly, the UN has its fair share of problems. The Security
Council is often unable to reach agreement and its permanent
menflbershi) is no longer representative. The General Assembly is
su)ject to deep divisions and can be overly politicized. Processes of
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lawmaking are often slow and cumbersome. While the reforms
suggested by the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change are promising--as indicated by the new
Human Rights Council-their realization and ultimate success are far
from assured. Reforms are urgently needed to ensure the long-term
viability of the UN. The Security Council must become more
representative.
Mechanisms to prevent political deadlock in the
Council and the General Assembly must be developed. The processes
of lawmaking must become more rapid and responsive.
Yet, consider the alternatives to lawmaking through the UN,
despite its faults. Informal and nonlegal cooperation will continue to
be important but cannot generate formal, binding obligations.
Bilateral treaties, while perhaps more effective in regulating matters
that only pertain to two states, cannot provide the seamless legal
regime needed to address global threats.
The use of regional
organizations as fora for international lawmaking has its place, but
cannot respond to truly global threats and creates the potential for
regional fragmentation. The creation of multilateral treaties through
ad hoc processes is costly, often exclusionary, and may lack the
legitimacy necessary to generate state compliance. The establishment
of an alternative global institution of a general nature as a
replacement for the UN is politically impossible. Institutions such as
the proposed Council of Democracies as an alternative or supplement
to the UN may be usefil, but in the short to medium term cannot
offer many of the key benefits of international lawmaking through the
UN.
In the face of avian flu, Al Qaeda, climate change, and the
proliferation of nuclear technologies, legitimate and effective global
rules of international law are urgently needed to coordinate states'
efforts and constrain governmental conduct. The UN continues to
offer critical advantages that cannot be easily rivaled in the creation of
such rules. The UN and its organs are more urgently needed today
than ever before to facilitate the creation of broad international
treaties, to codify and interpret customary rules, or to "legislate" on
behalf of the global community. Whether the UN's potential to
generate effective legal responses to these threats is fully realized,
however, will depend on whether the organization itself embraces the
reform process and whether states are willing to commit to the global
processes of lawmaking so urgently needed.
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REBUTTAL

The Dispensable United Nations

Abraham Bell'
It will perhaps help matters if I state at the outset my points of
agreement with William Burke-White. Like Professor Burke-White, I
believe that the International Law Commission (ILC) can play a
marginally useful role in helping to draft new treaties oi manymostly innocuous-subjects. I also agree with Professor Burke-White
that if one only takes into account the marginal cost of the ILC
drafting a new treaty and not other costs, the ILC might be the lowest
cost provider of these legal services.
Unfortunately, I believe this exhausts the points of agreement.
In essence, Professor Burke-W hite proposes four arguments for
believing that the UN is an efficient lawmaker, which, for reasons I
address below, I do not find convincing. He then makes an even
more unpersuasive leap from this claim to the argument that the UN
as a whole is an institution that makes a positive contribution to
international welfare. Professor Burke-White's argument on this last
point comes in two forms. The first, and weaker, of these assertions is
that "international peace and security" is promoted in some
significant manner "through the rule of law." The second, and more
modest-but, I would say, still unconvincing-claim proffered by
Professor Burke-White comes in a three-part proposition: (1) there
are global public goods; (2) some of these global public goods are in
the form of global laws; and (3) the UN is the best available institution
to lead the production of these goods. To be fair, I should add that
my skepticism about all of Professor Burke-White's claims places me,
rather than him, outside the mainstream.
Let me begin at a point of relative agreement with Professor
Burke-White.
To evaluate the UN's true contributions-or lack
thereof-it's best to understand that the UN actually fulfills a number
of roles. Its most high-profile role-and the one that generally serves
as the primary justification for the UN's continued existence-is its
responsibility to "maintain" peace and security. Other prominent
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roles include the UN's alleged contribution to the protection of
human rights and its production of information (and disinformation).
The smallest of the UN's official roles is its facilitation of various,
mostly noncontroversial treaties. There are also a handful of other
fuictions that we can safely ignore for the sake of discussion. A
nonofficial and rarely discussed role is the UN's production of
patronage jobs and distribution of rents: the UN has a workforce of
over 50,000, of which 7500 are employed by the Secretariat alone, and
a yearly operation budget of more than $2.5 billion; it also deploys
67,000 personnel in more than a dozen "peacekeeping" missions, and
it disposes of tens of billions of additional dollars through other
budgets.
I would argue that the UN makes a net negative contribution to
aggregate international welfare in all but the category of facilitating
mostly noncontroversial treaties. Additionally, I would argue that the
contributions in this last category could be made much more cheaply
by an ILC unconnected with the UN and organized along the lines of
the American Law Institute.
Let's look at each of these items in turn. The peace and security
role of the UN is loudly trumpeted in the UN Charter and informs
much of the activity of the Security Council and General Assembly.
Yet, with a handful of exceptions, the UN has made little contribution
here. Many conflicts have never been addressed by the UN at all.
Others have been addressed by dozens of toothless resolutions that
have made no dent. In some cases, the UN has exacerbated conflicts
by directly encouraging aggression-consider, for example, the
Human Rights Commission's (HRC's) repeated resolutions endorsing
Palestinian "resistance" by "all means necessary"-or by rewarding
aggressors. Even if one ignores the last set of cases, the overall UN
contribution here must be viewed as negative, because even doing
something ineffective is costly; at the very least, it involves
organization costs, and it likely discredits the idea of intervention,
raising the costs of other kinds of collective action.
The UN record on human rights is even worse. Professor BurkeWhite indirectly acknowledges the appalling record of the UN's HRC
by endorsing the reform that abolished the Commission and replaced
it with a Human Rights Council; disturbingly, Professor Burke-White
cites this reform as an accomplishment even though it is already clear
that the new Council shares all the pathologies of the old
Commission. Like the old Commission, the new HRC is comprised in
large part of serial human rights abusers like Saudi Arabia, Cuba,
China, and Azerbaijan and has an anti-Israel monomania that has led
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the Council to resist all country-specific resolutions except those
attacking Israel's human rights record and to hold two special sessions
so far-both attacking Israel-even as the Council has said nothing
about genocide in Darfur, oppression of women in Saudi Arabia,
political repression in Syria, a dystopic police state in North Korea,
and open planning for genocide in Iran. Meanwhile, the UN's
General Assembly has issued a number of human rights-related
resolutions, many of which have grown into treaties, but the
outpouring of platitudes has hardly translated into greater global
respect for human rights. Indeed, several studies, such as those of
Oona Hathaway, suggest that the human rights treaties have actually
served as cover for worsening human rights records.
Relatedly, the UN has used its enormous resources to produce
reams of information in the form of studies, investigations, etc. In
theory, provision of this sort of information by a central authority
could be beneficial, as it overcomes a potent free-rider problem.
However, the actual information produced is massaged in order to
distort decision making and is tailored to produce desired political
results. In some cases, the disinformation production is open, as in
the UN's only committees and divisions devoted to advancing the
claims of a single people or state-the Committee on the Exercise of
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Division for
Palestinian Rights-and their affiliated NGO Network on the
Question of Palestine. These have provided vital information, such as
that Zionism collaborated with the Nazis, that Jews encourage antiSemitism by failing to "contextuali[ze] the memory of the Holocaust"
and by subscribing to "genuine Zionism," and that an integral part of
Zionism is the tenet that "[iif Palestinians cannot be removed by
massacres and expulsion, they shall be removed by extermination." In
other contexts, the disinformation is less open, but no less disturbing.
For example, UN-appointed investigators have refused to find
evidence of weapons programs or genocidal intent for fear of the
likely political consequences. And no information at all has been
produced about many problems, such as terrorism by certain groups,
creating damaging misimpressions about the location and nature of
global challenges.
Even the basic lawmaking functions within the UN are not without
problems.
While I concede some usefulness in having a treaty
clearinghouse as well as a small commission that attempts to codify
various parts of international law, this seems more the work of a small
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academic department than a sprawling worldwide bureaucracy with
billion-dollar budgets. In addition, the UN has contributed a share of
mischief here, as various quasi-legislative acts of the General Assembly
have been presented as customary international law despite the
absence of state practice, or, indeed, a compelling rationale.
And thus we come to the true usefulness of the UN: its enormous
budget and patronage. As the Oil for Food scandal showed only too
well, the UN wields and abuses enormous amounts of money. In
addition to feather-nesting, the UN bureaucracy purchases various
constituencies that then support the continued work and funding of
the UN. Given the various pathologies of public choice, this sort of
negative-utility bureaucracy is all too sustainable. However, that does
not mean it makes a positive contribution to global welfare.
What then of Professor Burke-White's arguments in favor of the
UN? He argues that the UN does a better job of lawmaking than
anyone else for four reasons:
(1) the possibility for wide, and
sometimes even universal, participation in the creation of the legal
rules that regulate international affairs; (2) the UN's global
"legitimacy" that is critical to creating effective legal rules; (3) the
UN's representation of diverse interests and promotion of more
equitable outcomes; and (4) the reduction in contracting costs that
accompanies the use of the UN as a preexisting international
institution.
This last argument is the most easily disposed of. The fact that
many of the costs of negotiating a treaty in the UN appear in a
different UN budget hardly demonstrates that use of the UN is costeffective. While it is true that the costs of creating the UN are sunk
and should not be counted against the cost of negotiating a treaty
within the UN, ongoing operating costs are highly relevant. I suspect
that when all relevant costs are taken into account, in most cases, the
UN is not the most cost7effective means of negotiating treaties.
The alleged equality of UN representation is even less persuasive.
By the nature of international law, treaties bind only willing
signatories; thus, it is not clear how or why representation in the UN
enhances full representation in treaties. Unrepresented countries
would simply not be bound.
Moreover, the UN's record
demonstrates, if anything, lack of equality. The political blocs in the
UN are well-known, as are their prejudices. Finally, it is not clear why
equality among regimes of various degrees of repression and freedom
is a particularly compelling goal. By a similar token, in a world of
telecommunications and cheap travel, it is not clear why the existence
of the UN ensures greater treaty participation.
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The UN certainly enjoys a good reputation in some circles,
although this reputation is quite limited and does not seem to have
had very much effect in actually leading to positive results. The
reputation of the UN has had obviously limited effect in bringing
states to accept and comply with legal rules. And such positive
reputation as there is seems in many ways to have been purchased by
distributing funds and political favors in a manner that directly
undermines the mission of the UN.
Finally, it is difficult to see why one should ignore organizational
costs in examining the utility of the UN in undertaking action.
But even if one accepts arguendo all of Professor Burke-White's
arguments that the UN does a better job of global lawmaking than
anyone else, together with the indubitable proposition that there are
global challenges for which global solutions would enhance global
welfare, this hardly demonstrates that the UN warrants continued
support.
Consider the following argument.
Earthquakes are terrible
natural phenomena that kill many people every year. There is no
perfect solution known to humankind that will prevent earthquakes.
Proponents of human sacrifice to Mother Gaia hope that the human
sacrifices will reduce the number of earthquakes every year. While
they acknowledge that human sacrifice is not a perfect way of
eliminating earthquakes, everyone knows that there is no competing
method anywhere in the world that does a better job of reducing the
number of earthquakes. We should therefore increase the number of
human sacrifices to Mother Gaia.
I trust that most people will understand just how illogical this
argument is. Shockingly, however, this is the logical structure of
argument that is regularly invoked in international law and
international relations circles in favor of various functions of the UN.
Thus, to take a recent real-world example from the UN, consider
Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006, intended to
resolve conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in south Lebanon
primarily by disarming Hezbollah. Yet, since the cease-fire went into
effect on August 14, all relevant parties-fron the Lebanese
government and the UN force (UNIFIL) to Hezbollah itself-have
explicitly committed themselves to not disarming Hezbollah.
What then are we to think of the Security Council resolution that
seeks to bring about an end to the conflict by means of a disarmament
that certainly will not occur? Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
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explained: "I don't think there is an expectation that this force is
going to physically disarm Hezbollah. I think it's a little bit of a
misreading of how you disarm a militia. You have to have a plan, first
of all, for the disarmament of a militia, and then the hope is that some
people lay down their arms voluntarily ......
W"here is the logical connection between the UN resolution laying
out the plan and the hope?
Let me state this differently. My most basic premise-which is
appallingly controversial for most international law scholars-is that
legal rules and institutions should be judged by the results they
produce rather than the aspirations they purport to represent. In
saying this, incidentally, I do not mean to deny the potential utility of
legal rules that are themselves aspirational and are unaccompanied by
enforcement mechanisms. Rather, I mean that even in such cases,
since it is far from self-evident that the good aspirations produce good
results, only the good results should interest us.
Indeed, wellintended rules and institutions may produce harmful results on the
whole.
Professor Burke-White points to various global problems-WMD
proliferation, terrorism, infections disease, and the like. He does not
claim that perfect solutions may be found for these problems, and he
acknowledges a handful of UN problems, such as the Security
Council's frequent deadlocking and antiquated membership, the
political inclinations of the General Assembly, and the excessive
bureaucracy. He argues only that no international institution can take
certain kinds of lawmaking steps regarding these issues better than the
UN. He shows that the UN has taken many such lawmaking steps and
that proponents hope that such steps will lead to reducing the net
harm produced by these problems. He thus concludes that the UN is
"urgently needed." Nowhere does he actually demonstrate that these
lawmaking steps actually reduce the net harm produced by the
problems. Indeed, if one looks at the actual examples cited by
Professor Burke-White, it seems clear that the UN has not had a
positive effect at all.
Despite an impressive outpouring of words, the UN has done little
effectively to address the problems mentioned by Professor BurkeWhite-like terrorism prevention, global climate change, and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction-and in some ways has
even exacerbated them. The UN has done nothing to prevent North
Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons, and it seems highly unlikely
that the UN will do anything effective to prevent Iran from
comlleting its plans to obtain such weapons. The UN has played a
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useful role in collecting some kinds of information about Al Qaeda,
but has actually undermined other antiterror efforts. Not only did
UN organizations develop cozy relations with Hezbollah, but one of
the findings of the Oil for Food investigation was that UN money
indirectly subsidized Palestinian suicide bombings.
I've no doubt that there are global wrongs for which there are
available solutions-even if only partial-that are blocked by strategic
or collective action problems. However, in the main, the UN shows
no sign of being a useful mechanism for resolving these problems.

CLOSING STATEMENT

William W. Burke-White
While working under mosquito netting in Gulu, Uganda, where I
am doing research on the political effects of the International
Criminal Court, I am using an intermittent supply of electricity from a
generator to power my laptop and access Professor Bell's response. I
am taken aback not only by the professor's tone, but by his apparent
desire to change the boundaries of the narrow argument of this
debate. The argument I have set forth is that "the active engagement
of the Security Council and a range of other UN organs in the
processes of international lawmaking has never been more necessary."
Professor Bell has responded to my intentionally narrow argument
with a full-blown and energized-even angry-attack on the whole
UN.
Perhaps my read of Professor Bell's response is in part influenced
by the conditions in which I am attempting to respond, but I doubt it.
This is, after all, a place in which the UN may be the only entity
contributing to the welfare of the local population.
First, the
professor steps outside the debate's set boundaries to argue "that the
UN makes a net negative contribution to aggregate international
welfare." This does not respond to my basic claims about the
importance of the UN to the creation of international legal rules,
particularly in the face of present global challenges. I am simply not
going to follow him into an argument about the more general
contribution of the UN to international welfare-not because of my
precarious electricity source, but because that is not our task in this
debate. Instead, I shall limit this counter response to those of the
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professor's arguments that address the UN's role in international
lawmaking and to my basic claims regarding the importance of
international legal rules, particularly in the face of present global
challenges.
Professor Bell's most significant claims with respect to the UN's
international lawmaking function are that the rule of law does not
promote international peace and security and that international law is
not a "global public good." Hence, it would follow from his argument
that, even if the UN were an efficient lawmaker, the resultant legal
rules are a burden on, not a benefit to, global welfare. This argument
has little merit. It would be interesting to debate the level of
contribution international law makes to international peace and
security or public welfare, but to deny any contribution stretches the
limits of reality. At the very least, international law provides three
important functions that impact international peace and security and
global public welfare: coordination, constraint, and process. First,
international legal regimes allow cross-border coordination on issues
ranging from the protection of diplomats to the protection of
mountain gorillas, from the smooth transit of aircraft to the accurate
delivery of international post. Second, international legal rules
provide constraints on state behavior. These constraints may not be
absolute, but they do increase the costs of defection and pressure
states to conform their behavior to agreed-upon standards in areas
like the conduct of war and the protection of human rights. Third,
even where international legal regimes do not result in agreed-upon
standards of behavior, they often create processes for cooperation and
dispute settlement amongst states that in turn may promote
international peace and security. Professor Bell is right that state
behavior may often fall short of the rhetoric of legal rules, but those
rules still generate pressures on state behavior and make considerable
contributions to the conduct of international affairs and domestic
governance.
Despite Professor Bell's contention that international law does not
promote public welfare, he acknowledges "some usefulness in having
a treaty clearinghouse as well as a small commission that attempts to
codify various parts of international law." He suggests, however, that
this function would be better carried out by "a small academic
department." Admittedly, a small academic department might Iye a
less costly producer of draft treaty texts, but it would lack the
legitimacy, global voice, and institutional backing afforded the ILC by
its position within the UN system.
Would that my academic
department had the global clout to draft international treaties! But,
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alas, even Penn and Fordham Law Schools are unable to supplant the
ILC and the UN.
I turn now to Professor Bell's specific responses to my arguments
that the UN is necessary as an international lawmaker, particularly at
the present moment. Unfortunately, only a very small portion of
Professor Bell's comments address the issues at the heart of our
debate, and his analysis does nothing to change my basic position.
I argued first that the UN affords the possibility of broad and,
perhaps even universal, involvement in the creation of international
legal rules. I never suggested that all states willjoin all treaties drafted
under UN auspices. States will only ratify treaties when they deem it
in their interests-for whatever reasons-to do so. However, because
all states are represented at the UN and maintain missions in New
York, drafting treaties through the UN increases the likelihood that a
significant number of states will be aware of a treaty process and
involve themselves in it. Such participation, in turn, increases the
likelihood that the ultimate text of a treaty will reflect the interests of
such states and that they will at least consider ratification. Such wide
participation is often critical to addressing pressing global challenges
for which broad-based coordination and cooperation is needed.
Second, I argued that international lawmaking through the UN
offers critical legitimacy for international legal rules. Professor Bell
responds by claiming that the UN's reputation is "quite limited" and
"purchased by distributing funds and political favors." His view of the
UN is clearly very negative. But, as he admits, his views are "outside
the mainstream." Some powerful states may at times be frustrated by
the UN, particularly when it seeks to block their international aims.
Yet, in much of the rest of the world, the UN does in fact carry global
legitimacy. I write this response from an internally displaced persons'
camp in northern Uganda. Here there may be frustration that the
UN has not been able to end the twenty-year conflict, but the array of
UN relief organizations are recognized as a critical lifeline for the
population and because of this, the UN is held in extraordinarily high
regard. It is this regard-which is by no means limited to northern
Uganda-that carries over into the lawmaking arena and gives the UN
an unrivaled ability to generate compelling international legal rules.
Third, I suggested that creating international law through the UN
results in greater diversity and equality of outcomes. To be clear, in
many aspects of international law diversity and equality may not be
appropriate goals. Hence, bilateral or regional treaties are often the
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most effective international legal instruments for interstate
cooperation. However, when responding to truly global challenges or
addressing subjects that require world-wide coordination, diversity
and equality in international lawmaking may be the best way to ensure
wide-spread compliance with the resultant legal rules. The inclusion
of diverse views may water-down legal instruments or produce results
that do not appeal to certain states. If certain states want thicker legal
regimes than treaties with diverse participation may afford, they are
able to enter into supplemental agreements amongst themselves.
Even relatively thin treaties that generate widespread compliance,
however, can have a significant and positive impact on addressing
global threats or promoting worldwide coordination.
Finally, I argued that international lawmaking through the UN
offers a reduction in contracting costs. Professor Bell disagrees,
suggesting that the UN merely shifts costs to different budget lines.
Neither Professor Bell nor I have actual budget figures for
international treaty drafting within and without the UN. But, simple
logic recognizes that the UN already has the infrastructure in place to
undertake international treaty negotiations.
That decreases the
marginal cost of each new lawmaking process.
In the case of
multilateral treaties drafted outside the UN, much of the sunk costs of
that infrastructure would have to be expended anew for each separate
treaty regime. Equally, operating outside the UN, states would need
to make considerable incremental financial outlays to participate in
ad hoc treaty drafting processes, whereas most states already have
legal representation at the UN.
The efficiency and reduced
contracting costs that come with these permanent institutions make it
easier to undertake treaty drafting processes, facilitate cost-effective
state participation in those processes, and increase the likelihood of
the successful conclusion of treaty instruments. Without the UN's
infrastructure, the depth and scope of international treaty rules
regulating state behavior would probably be far more limited.
Though one's normative view could differ, for me at least, a
considerable number of those instruments promote global welfare.
I agree with Professor Bell that specialized institutions might be
able to perform some of these international law making functions
more efficiently than the UN. But, none can offer the collective
benefits and public goods provided by the UN in the creation of
international legal rules. An International Treaty Depository could
quite cheaply maintain records of international agreements in force.
Law professors could dream up potential treaty clauses. Conference
centers could host ad hoc treaty negotiations.
However, such
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individualized bodies would lack the participation, legitimacy,
equality, and established infrastructure of the UN and would be
unlikely to produce effective, much less respected, international legal
regimes.
I would be among the first to suggest scores of reforms that would
make the UN more effective generally or as an international lawmaker
specifically. The UN is far from perfect, but it is the best institution
we have available to generate new international legal rules. Its
contribution to the creation of international law is significant, and the
UN is likely to continue to lead such processes for the foreseeable
future.
CLOSING STATEMENT
Abraham Bell
Professor Burke-White is quite right to identify in my writing a
distinctly negative tone directed toward the UN-the subject of our
discussion. While I have nothing but the highest respect for Professor
Burke-White, I think it is appropriate to have a negative attitude
toward an institution that does more harm than good for the world.
Of course, whether the UN is such an institution is a point on which
Professor Burke-White and I clearly disagree.
Professor Burke-W hite suggests that it is beyond the scope of our
debate to discuss the overall utility of the UN, but he continues to
make claims that go a fair way toward erasing the distinctions between
that debate and the narrower debate on the UN's contribution to
international law. Additionally, and just as importantly, Professor
Burke-White missteps by claiming that international law is a positive
utility good, (as I would call it, rather than public good)-a claim with
which

I

heartily

agree

in

sonic

cases-and

then

describing

international law uniformly, as if the positive utility of agreements on
uniform air traffic rules demonstrates the positive utility of human
rights treaties. On this last point, of course, I disagree very strongly.
Let me begin with the latter point first.
International legal rules are made for a variety of reasons. Some
legal rules are made in order to ease international cooperation on
matters like the flow of international post or in order to create
reciprocal and easily understood rules of the treatment of diplomats.
As I said earlier, the UN makes a valuable contribution to the
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production of such innocuous rules by helping codify them through
the ILC. And, as I also said, this contribution could also be made just
as easily by a small academic body without the attendant bureaucracy
of tens of thousands and a budget of billions.
I doubt that an international consortium of top academics would
enjoy significantly less legitimacy and goodwill for this limited
function than the UN. Moreover, these are precisely the kinds of
treaties for which such legitimacy and goodwill are not terribly
necessary to sign up customers. Incidentally, Professor Burke-W hite
argues that I am wrong to view the UN's legitimacy as limited in scope
primarily to its distribution of largesse. He then brings as an example
the high legitimacy enjoyed by the UN in Uganda due to the UN's
distribution of aid and suggests that this legitimacy carries over into
the lawmaking world. I rather think that his example makes precisely
the point that I was trying to make about the kinds of legitimacy
enjoyed by the UN. In addition, Professor Burke-White suggests that
"powerful states" are the chief objectors to the "global legitimacy"
carried by the UN. But all states, great and small, as large as the US or
as small as Lebanon, do a wonderful job of recognizing the legitimacy
of UN action that regards others, while ignoring the legitimacy when
it conflicts with their own agenda.
Other legal rules are not made to ease cooperation, but to send
messages, often in direct opposition to the actual results of the rules
themselves. Thus, for example, legal treaties on human rights are
apparently made not to create or cement uniform standards of human
rights, but, rather, to distract criticism. Thus it is that human rights
treaties have demonstrably failed to lead to better human rights
records. The General Assembly has played an indispensable role in
creating such kinds of treaties. However, I do not consider the results
to be positive utility goods, no matter how high-minded the
sentiments that appear in the words employed by the treaties.
Professor Burke-White misapprehends my argument if he reads
me to say that international law never produces positive utility. But
the agreement that it is sometimes good hardly demonstrates that it is
all the time, or even most of the time.
And now to the second issue of the UN as a whole.
Let us assume, arguendo, that I am right about the overall
negative contribution of the UN to world utility. If that is the case, are
any of Professor Burke-White's arguments about the importance of
the UN to lawmaking persuasive? Should we support a multibillion
dollar institution with multiple world headquarters and a permanent
bureaucracy of tens of thousands so that more states will be aware of a
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treaty-making process? Or to more precisely regulate the minutes of
debate among delegates of various potential signatories? Or to be
sure that treaty advocates remember to work through the whole
rolodex and touch base with all potential signatories? Why is this sort
of subsidy necessary? Are coordination costs like telephone calls and
ad hoc conferences that high?
Professor Burke-White suggests
viewing the UN bureaucracy and structural costs as sunk. However,
the enormous operating budgets, as well as the opportunity costs of
continued devotion of physical assets like realty and less tangible
assets like diplomatic efforts and time are not sunk. They represent
the potential for enormous savings.
This brings us to the elephant in the room.
There are some kinds of potential international laws that would
make a positive contribution to global utility but that are not adopted
due to free-riding, defections and other strategic moves. These
strategic obstacles could be overcome by certain kinds of collective
action mechanisms. Thus, were the UN this sort of mechanism, it
would play an indispensable role in the production of some types of
international law. However, as it is configured, the UN does not, has
not, and never will play this role. It is true as well that there are real
international public goods (albeit, impure), i.e., goods of supranational scale that will not be provided by competitive forces among
states. Thus, in theory, there is a net positive contribution to global
utility to be made by a supplier of such goods. However, the UN has
never been, nor will it ever be a cost-effective and reliable supplier of
such goods. The valuable contributions that could be made by a truly
effective global collective action mechanism for combating military
aggression or human rights predations therefore remain theoretical,
and cannot be associated with the UN.
Without these contributions, what does the UN contribute to
justify the enormous outlays, and, indeed, the undermining of other,
potentially more effective means of collective decision making? I'm
afraid that I cannot think of any justification.
Certainly the
justifications mentioned by Professor Burke-White, such as treaty
participation,

could

be

easily accomplished

through

less

costly

institutions than the UN. Stated otherwise, although I recognize that
the UN produces items of value as well as items that harm, what little
good it produces is not worth the price of the UN's continued
existence.
If one agrees with me that as a whole the institution of the UN
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produces more costs than benefits, then this would seem definitively
to rule out continued operation of the UN for any purposes,
including for lawmaking. However, this is not to say that there should
be no international institutions that contribute to lawmaking. There's
flo reason that a body like the ILC that his hitherto been associated
with the UN could not continue to operate under a less costly
bureaucratic canopy, and under a different formulation. There's no
reason why state delegations could not meet, even regularly, in order
to negotiate and adopt treaties. In other words, there's no reason to
forgo producing such positive utility goods as are to be found in
international lawmaking in a post-UN world.
Finally, let us return to the broad claim made by Professor BurkeWhite's original piece and not referenced in his rebuttal"international lawmaking through the UN may be the best and
possibly only means to promote international peace and security
through the rule of law"-as well as the narrower claim central to both
of his pieces: the "active engagement of the Security Council and a
range of other UN organs in the processes of international lawmaking
has never been more necessary."
Let me address each claim in turn.
I think I have already adequately expressed my skepticism about
the ability of the UN to promote international peace and security by
means of international lawmaking, as well as international law
enforcement, or, indeed, any of the other means available under the
UN Charter. While there may be individual incidents in which the
UN has made a positive contribution to international peace and
security, on the whole, the UN's contribution, when taking into
account organizational and other associated costs, has been negative.
Thus, as I wrote earlier, even if the UN is the institution best situated to
promote international peace and security, it is still not a good
institution. Professor Burke-White would judge the contributions of
UN lawmaking on peace and security positively on the basis of
contributions on "issues ranging from the protection of diplomats to
the protection of mountain gorillas, from the smooth transit of
aircraft to the accurate delivery of international post." I trust it is
evident why I think this is a non-sequitur. Alternatively, he sees a
positive contribution in speculated pressure on states to behave better
in the arenas of "the conduct of war [and] the protection of human
rights," as well as "processes for cooperation and dispute settlement
amongst states that [] may promote international peace and security"
(emphasis added). Yet, such empirical evidence as there is suggests
that his speculations are wrong and that the effects are just the
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opposite.
As to the second claim, I think it is ill-founded too, but I should
preface my explanation with a linguistic note. As I wrote previously, it
makes no sense to talk about what is needed when we should be talking
about whether particular acts or institutions are worthwhile. We may
need world peace and a Security Council that creates and preserves
world peace, but that doesn't mean we are going to get them. So let
me take Professor Burke-White's claim to be that the active
engagement of the Security Council and other UN organs in the
processes of international law is beneficial. Here, once again, I find
no grounds for agreement, aside from an ILC subject to the caveats I
already discussed.
The General Assembly, notwithstanding an entirely dispensable
and largely ceremonial role in some ILC-driven treaties, has primarily
"contributed" to international law by producing a raft of human rights
treaties that do not protect human rights, a number of anti-terrorism
treaties that do not prevent or diminish terrorism, and some war and
military-related treaties that do not improve global welfare with
respect to war. At the same time, it has overseen the treaties' nonimplementation and taken other routine action in such a fashion as to
actually diminish respect for human rights, increase terrorism and
foment conflict. It has also abused the goodwill of those who believe
in the principles of human rights and peace in order to extract huge
rents for the unworthy and dishonest.
The Security Council, for its part, has carefully done little to
nothing to encourage compliance with the high-minded fluff nursed
into full-fledged treaties by the General Assembly.
The Security
Council has engaged in quasi-legislation, such as the antiterrorism
Resolution 1373 mentioned by Professor Burke-White, but to dubious
effect. Thus, for example, while Resolution 1373 calls upon states to
[flreeze without delay finds and other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or
participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of
persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such
persons and entities,
various UN organizations as well as many Security Council member
states continue to cooperate with and provide fhnds to persons and
entities that facilitate terrorist acts as defined by the same
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
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Terrorism of 9 December 1999 that is referenced by Resolution 1373.
I have not yet mentioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
a body that has played a useful role in the development of some
doctrines of international law, despite also setting back other
doctrines in a handful of horribly politicized and legally indefensible
decisions. Like the ILC, the ICJ could exist independently of the UN,
as it did prior to the UN Charter under a different name and
formulation. Indeed, the ICJ would probably benefit from being cut
loose; ICJ independence would end such political distortions of the
Court's appointment and decision-making procedure as the ICJ sitting
in judgment on Israel's anti-terror actions in 2004 while the UNcontrolled appointment procedures made Israel the only state in the
world ineligible to have ajudge sitting on the Court.
To sum up: there are some valuable lawmaking capacities in the
UN, but none that could not be more valuably provided outside of the
UN. As the UN is an institution whose net contribution to global
welfare is negative, it would be better to move these lawmaking
capacities out of the UN forthwith.

